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Abstract: After adopting and extending the “test of truth as effective action” that Newell pro-
poses in “A Theory of Interdisciplinary Studies,” this article proposes “living well” as the goal
of knowledge processes. With this in mind, it explores disciplinarity—the unspoken assumption
underlying Newell’s argument. Disciplinarity is discovered to be an historical and cultural phe-
nomenon, demonstrating the partial and situated character of all knowledge formations, rather
than a privileged site of especially valid knowing. Alternatives are offered to the notions of
interdisciplinarity and discipline. Integrative praxes (the alternative to interdisciplinarity) are
practices, informed by theory and differentiated by existential situation, aimed at living well.
Knowledge formations (the alternative to disciplines) are both bodies of knowledge and pro-
cesses of coming to know that contain within themselves dynamic patterns from which they
have been generated and by which they will be transformed. They are ecological, developing in
relation with other developing entities and composed in part of material and structures taken
from them. The proposal is that living well is best served by seeking integrative praxes that learn
from multiple knowledge formations and fostering ongoing conversation among these praxes.
Preface
    HIS ARTICLE BEGAN as a paper responding fairly directly to an earlier
draft of William Newell’s “A Theory of Interdisciplinary Studies” which is
the occasion of this number of Issues in Integrative Studies (IIS). I soon real-
ized, though, that my real response to Newell’s work was to explore a space
of thought from which I had previously been working only in an inarticulate
manner. This article explores that space of thought, attempting along the way
to show how it connects to, diverges from, and reflects upon fundamental
assumptions embedded in Newell’s proposal.
Several existing literatures shed light in some of this space. Before I en-
countered Newell’s ideas, I was only marginally aware of these literatures,
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and although I am now investigating them, it will be some time before I am
familiar with them, so my “traveler’s reports” are more questions than con-
clusions.
I would like to begin by asking why we think, or at least why I think.
There is, of course, the bio-genetic answer: we can’t help thinking; that is the
sort of animals we are. This is undoubtedly true. I imagine, though, that like
bipedalism and neoteny, inveterate thinking has provided some evolutionary
advantage to our species.1 Here I am both Socratic and Whiteheadean. As
Socrates would have it, people seek to do the good. For now, I will assume
this means to thrive, a phenomenon that includes physical, emotional, and
spiritual well-being and includes such qualities as vitality, joy, peace, social
and cultural connection (in the present and from past to future), and an expe-
rience of personal meaning.2 Whitehead (1958) puts it a bit differently. The
function of reason, he claims, is first to live, then to live better, and finally to
live well. My sense is that living well for Whitehead resembles Socrates’
good. Good thinking, then, enhances our ability to live well, to do what it is
good to do.3 As Donna Haraway remarks, we need knowledge that, “offers a
more adequate, richer, better account of a world, in order to live in it well”
(1996, p. 133). 4
Near the end of his piece, Newell asks how we can test “interdisciplinary
integration,” responding that “the proof of successful integration is prag-
matic. . . . In general, can one act effectively ” (p. 22)? As he goes on to point
out, we live in a world that is both urgent and surprising. Our circumstances
force us to act with an incomplete understanding of the context and conse-
quences of our actions. In the face of this, Newell counsels humility (p. 22).
I agree completely. But I would like to linger on the “test” of our work here at
the beginning of our considerations. Perhaps this test is a place of departure,
rather than a destination?
What does it mean that the proof of our thinking is effective action, re-
membering that doing nothing is action? Newell is working with the ex-
ample of acid rain. Effective action would “help solve the problem,” but
because the world is surprising, our actions may “produce large and unex-
pected results” (p. 22). Implicitly, Newell foresees that the actions our under-
standing leads us to take today may create circumstances that call for new
understandings and new actions tomorrow. We live in a changing universe
whose changes are, in part, results of our actions.
Newell took two very important steps. First, in his test he abandoned the
“copy theory of truth.” Thought’s test is not the accuracy with which it de-
scribes “reality,” but its capacity to orient our action. This decisively puts to
73Integrative Praxes
an end any notion of “thought (or art) for its own sake.” 5 Second, he under-
stands thinking as an activity which participates in a process that it affects
and is affected by. This helps us remember that Socrates’ doing the good and
Whitehead’s living well are activities, not theories. Yet they require theory.
Living well or doing good involve thoughtful practice and practical thought-
fulness. The marriage of science and art, as Wendell Berry (2000) reminds
us, is in many ways an ordinary thing:
“[S]cience” means knowing and “art” means doing, and . . . one is mean-
ingless without the other . . . the two are commonly interinvolved and
naturally cooperative in the same person . . . it is not possible to imagine a
farmer who does not use both art and science. (p. 124)
The test of thought, then, is its ability to contribute to practices of living
well. Because the universe is surprising, these practices cannot be static sets
of skills, but must include the ability to respond appropriately in a dynamic
context. Many factors contribute to the dynamism of the world, which ap-
pears wherever we look. Continents break apart and drift away from one
another; huge sheets of ice flow over the now-temperate zones and retreat
again to the polar regions; long eras of drought alternate with those of benign
weather and good growing; new diseases (like AIDS) appear and challenge
societies’ resources for health care, public policy, private conduct, and dis-
course; economic and socio-political developments strengthen both global-
izing and fragmenting trajectories; international terrorism provokes responses
that affect a web of social, cultural, personal, and individual factors.6 Our
own actions are one dynamic element.
There is another source of ambiguity and openness inherent in knowledge
processes, which Newell does not take into account. Newell acknowledges
the nonlinear evolutionary path of complex systems (i.e., the world), so he
sees that our actions may lead to unforeseen consequences. He does not ex-
plicitly acknowledge our inherent incapacity to know the world completely
or adequately at any given moment. The insufficiency of our behaviors and
our surprise at their consequences derives not only from the complex
unpredictability of the world’s process of development, but also from the
fallibility and incompleteness of our ability to understand.
Our (partial) understanding guides us to act in ways that have unexpected
results, to which we must respond in novel and unanticipated ways. For ex-
ample, our use of antibiotics has created new risks, embodied in the growing
array of antibiotic-resistant diseases. The actions our understanding helps
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shape today will (sometimes) create circumstances that call for new under-
standings and new actions. Part of what we need to know is how to change.
We must “make room for surprises and ironies at the heart of all knowledge
production; we are not in charge of the world” (Haraway, 1996, 125).
So the test of thought is its ability to contribute to what I will call integra-
tive praxes, by which I mean the sorts of dynamic and thoughtful practices
and dynamic and practical thoughtfulness considered above. The plural praxes
is significant here. We know that even the self is complex, internally contra-
dictory, and affected by context. “The knowing self is partial in all its guises,
never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and
stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see
together without claiming to be another” (Haraway, 1996, p. 119). 7
    This is one reason we need humility. Who is doing the integrating also
makes a difference. It is one thing for me to integrate your insights into mine
(to incorporate you into me). It is quite another for you to integrate my in-
sights into yours (for you to incorporate me).
Nevertheless, integration, in the way I wish to use it, in a sense precedes
rather than follows upon the work of thought. That is to say, there is really
only one question, “How shall we live?” There is really only one test “the
health and durability of human and natural communities” (Berry, 2000, p.
134). Thinking is integrative if it contributes to this health and durability. Of
course, this formulation opens endless questions circling around these two:
How can we recognize “living well”? And how can we act to realize it? Ask-
ing these questions, persistently and insistently, is, I believe, part of integra-
tive praxes. Confronting our inability to answer them is one motive for the
humility Newell urges upon us, and which is also, I believe, a necessary
component of integrative praxes.8
How might an understanding of this “end” or “test” that Newell proposes
and I adopt for integrative praxis affect how we think about interdisciplinary
study? The subtitle of this article suggests we move away from thinking of
the disciplines as unique sources or resources for knowledge and thought.
We might instead imagine the disciplines as one sort of knowledge forma-
tion, of which there are several kinds, for example the knowledge of workers
(carpenters, mechanics, website designers, farmers), the knowledge oppressed
peoples have of those who oppress them, the knowledge West African immi-
grants have of “the system” and how it works in New York City (Stoller,
1997, pp. 91-118), the knowledge of Songhay sorcerers, the knowledge of
statespeople and diplomats, the knowledge of mothers gazing into the eyes
of infants, the knowledge of indigenous peoples for the places they tradition-
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ally inhabit, the knowledge that Judy Baca calls “maintaining a relationship
with the dust of one’s ancestors [which] requires a generational relationship
with the land and a respectful treatment of other life found on the land” (Baca,
1994, np). Any of these and other knowledges may be useful or even neces-
sary to think well in a particular context or about a specific concern. This
takes into account, for example, the varieties of local, vernacular, or cross-
cultural knowledge that are sometimes critical for success.
The term knowledge formation intentionally embraces an ambiguity be-
tween noun and verb. Knowledge formations are both processes and entities.
They are forms that contain within themselves dynamic patterns from which
the form has been generated and by which it will be transformed, although
knowledge formations are not monadic or self-generating. Like other enti-
ties, knowledge formations are ecological, developing in relation with other
developing entities and composed in part of material and structures taken
from them. What Newell thinks of as “interdisciplinary studies,” I tend to
think of as “learning from multiple knowledge formations.”
Another benefit of the notion of knowledge formation is that it situates us
(as knowers or thinkers) in a network that includes institutional structures,
economic forces, social interactions, political considerations, historical in-
fluences, personal motivations and so forth. We are “in formation,” both in
the sense of engaging in a process that develops form and in the sense of
being in a structured relationship with other entities in the formation (like
migrating geese, for example). As we think about the disciplines, and about
interdisciplinary or integrative study, we will need to keep in mind the im-
portance of these formative relationships and processes.
The existence of multiple knowledge formations reminds us, as scholars,
of what we so often remind our students: we do not know what we do not
know. Part of what I want to say in this article is that we need to imagine the
existence of knowledges we do not now know: new contexts and formations
of knowledge, not just new contents of knowledge or transformations of our
existing knowledge formations. Such an act of imagination is extraordinarily
difficult, since our imagination is itself informed by our knowledge. In fact,
imagining genuinely unknown knowledge formations may best be represented
by a pregnant openness, a realm of possibility that can be lived into but not
provided with specific contents. This makes giving examples a dicey task.
Any example I provide below rests on and roots in the knowledge formations
in which I participate, most of which belong to or are credible in the acad-
emy. Yet the knowledge formations I want to point toward are outside the
penumbra of the currently known (though some may be known to those in
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other cultures, sub-cultures, or classes excluded from the academy). So make
use of examples, to the extent that they help to provide content to what other-
wise may seem abstract, but remember that they are limping and halting point-
ers toward what remains to be discovered.
Introduction
Before we go further, it may be helpful to set this conversation in the context
of knowledge formation. Newell’s “A Theory of Interdisciplinary Studies,”
attempts to provide a rigorous conceptual rationale for interdisciplinary studies
by defining its proper objects of study, its appropriate methods, and the hall-
marks of what he takes to be its primary trope (integration).9 It marks a sig-
nificant step in the maturation of our shared enterprise, sometimes called
“interdisciplinarity.”
Newell envisions his ideas in the context of a momentous conflict over
interdisciplinarity carried out within the AIS, as well as elsewhere. Against
“a vocal faction . . . who caution against definitional closure for
interdisciplinarity on the grounds that settling on any definition excludes as
well as includes,” he aligns himself with those who have been, “seeking cred-
ibility for interdisciplinary study through conceptual clarity and, ultimately,
through standards for judging its quality” (p. 6). This is a contentious charac-
terization. Is it true that those opposed to definitional closure for
interdisciplinarity hold their position solely, or even mainly, on the grounds
Newell states? Where is the warrant for this claim? Those who resist  closure
of definitions are not necessarily opposed to conceptual clarity and may have
and apply standards for judging quality. Perhaps, too, clarity and standards
have their own soft underbellies, as well. Wittgenstein remarked that a fuzzy
picture of a fuzzy reality is truthful (1958).10
Then again, “seeking credibility” raises its own questions. With whom do
we seek credibility? Why do we seek it? What are the consequences of hav-
ing or not having credibility? How is this credibility related to the test of our
thought—its contribution to living well? Who is credentialed to pass the judg-
ment of credibility, and are these credentials primarily intellectual, or eco-
nomic and political, or should they be understood in some other way? Per-
haps some who resist Newell’s path to credibility do so because they do not
acknowledge the authority of the creditors whose approval Newell seeks.
Perhaps they even believe that becoming credible in that structure of knowl-
edge formation vitiates the impact or even falsifies the meaning of interdisci-
plinary study.
Newell has passionately and effectively pursued credibility by means of
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writings, consultations, and his role as Executive Director of AIS. His paper
may be seen as a culminating statement emerging from a long and distin-
guished career. Nonetheless, IDS’s movement from wilderness to domestic-
ity, however salutary from some perspectives, may have its attendant dan-
gers.
Newell’s essay is courageous in broaching key theoretical, methodologi-
cal, and even metaphysical questions in interdisciplinarity, raising philosophi-
cal issues, surrounding its practice, which have been more observed from a
distance than engaged. I hope it precipitates the deep, broad, and multi-voiced
conversation from which genuine philosophies of integrative praxes might
emerge. Entering into this conversation, it seems to me, requires us to shift
our footing somewhat from the customary staging area for academic dis-
course. In some ways, this is a typical scholarly dispute. Experienced senior
academics are contesting concepts of field-definition in a professional soci-
ety journal. But this is also an existential disagreement. Ultimately, what gets
to count as legitimate interdisciplinary work, and where and how it is housed
within institutions, will have significant implications in the lives of individu-
als and of colleges and universities, as well as for the practice(s) of
interdisciplinarity. Beyond that, if the results of our thinking work are in any
way consequential, if they have some relationship to our ability or inability
to live well, the adjudication of this question will affect the lives of many
communities and individuals far removed from the academy. I want to argue
that this is, in fact, always actually the case with questions of knowledge.
Claims about knowledge make “claims on people’s lives” (Haraway, 1996,
p. 121). Claims about knowledge (such as Newell is making) have existen-
tial consequences. Given Newell’s test of truth, these consequences are part
of, not distinct from, the knowledge which is claimed.
The discourse involving Newell’s article and mine is unusual because it
centers around processes of discipline formation rather than around research
agendas or findings and/or their theoretical explication (see, e.g., Lenoir,
1993). Because of this, the conversation inevitably inhabits arenas of passion
and commitment which are usually hidden or effaced in the academy. Re-
vealing these arenas may be salutary. Perhaps there are always questions of
institutional, economic, and personal power embedded in knowledge pro-
duction processes; perhaps they are more constitutive than we acknowledge;
perhaps they should be more clearly evident on the surfaces of our discourses.11
Newell’s main work has taken place primarily in the area of discipline
formation. He has been concerned to clarify the appropriate nature of
interdisciplinarity, to embed those clarifications in the literature, and to insti-
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tutionalize them within the academy. He has served repeatedly as a consult-
ant at colleges and universities seeking to formalize interdisciplinary struc-
tures, and he has played and continues to play a determinative role in estab-
lishing those persons authorized by the AIS to do such consulting. In this
capacity, he has been perhaps the single most important person, nationwide,
in shaping the official face of interdisciplinarity in the United States over the
past thirty years. His work is one major reason that interdisciplinarity has
grown in respect and resources over the past twenty-five years, and many of
us, myself included, owe him a debt not only of gratitude, but in recognition
of the economic and status rewards we have reaped as a result. Despite this,
I fear that the most important potential contributions of interdisciplinarity
are losing more than they are gaining through these victories.12
In what follows, I hope to open a conversation about integrative praxes,
rather than to provide a conclusive interpretation that forecloses other possi-
bilities. My goal is not that my theory should replace his in the position of
gatekeeper for interdisciplinary study, but that the gatekeeping function be
plural, complex, and subtle.13 We are not accustomed to academic debates
that require reflection on the institutional forms and structures within which
the participants and their practices inhere. We do not usually include conver-
sations about gatekeeping within academic journals or scholarly presenta-
tions. But these issues are, I believe, fundamental to this discussion, and we
will need to keep them in mind.
We also will have to go beyond a close reading and careful response to
Newell’s text, as provided, because his argument rests on a hidden premise
of tremendous power but limited credibility. This hidden premise is
disciplinarity—the disciplines themselves taken as necessary preconditions
for and foundations of interdisciplinarity—which leads to the notion of “in-
tegration of disciplinary knowledge” as the key unanswered question facing
interdisciplinarity. (See, e.g., pp. 1-2, 13, 16.) The disciplines even provide
Newell with criteria to evaluate interdisciplinary solutions. “The best solu-
tion minimizes the change in disciplinary assumptions” (p. 21).14 Others make
exactly the opposite claim: those solutions are best which confound and trans-
form the disciplines (See quote below from Barthes, 1984). I would like to
pursue this counter claim for a while, to question Newell’s hidden premise.
“[T]he various disciplines,” Newell claims, “have been developed pre-
cisely to study the individual facets or subsystems” of complex systems. (p.
2) This is not self evident, and Newell only states but does not demonstrate
it. What if the so-called object of study is not the primary factor determining
the coming into being, development, and primary content of a discipline?
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What if disciplines and disciplinarity play a role in constituting the very ob-
jects they study? What if we explore the disciplines as knowledge forma-
tions—historical and cultural artifacts embodying, participating in, and re-
generating a complex of factors tied to psychological, economic, structural,
and intercultural developments in Western Europe and the United States over
the past two-and-a-half centuries? 15 This may cause us to re-evaluate the
corpus they present to us as knowledge. Understood this way, disciplines
may be unreliable guides toward a knowledge capable of assisting human
understanding and conduct toward personal and ecological well-being, indi-
vidual and socio-cultural equity, or those most ineffable of human goods—
wisdom and joy. From this understanding we might join Sandra Harding’s
call for a “successor science” (Harding, 1986). Such a science would ac-
knowledge the situated, historical, contextual nature of all knowledge, the
need for consistent criticism of the specific means by which particular mean-
ings are made, “and a no nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a
‘real’ world, one that can be partially shared” (Haraway, 1996, p. 113). 16
There is a corollary to the contention that disciplines are artifacts. It is that
interdisciplinarity has been subjected to normalizing pressures, working in
and through academic institutions but reflecting the continuing operation of
the complex of factors described above. The plurality of interdisciplinarities
may have become less rich and the range of notions about interdisciplinarity
may have become narrower, not as the result of increasing agreement among
“experts” based on improved reasoning and evidence, but because of the
structuring and limiting effects of the socio-cultural and economic field within
which interdisciplinarity has had to function.17 If disciplines are manifesta-
tions of social, political, economic, and other institutional forces, effective
interdisciplinarities may imply new institutional forms more than any spe-
cific intellectual contents, methods, practices, processes, or theories. Inte-
grative praxes may lead academic inquiry, embodied in interdisciplinarity, to
participate in knowledge formations outside the academy (and, even, outside
Euro-American culture). To the extent that interdisciplinarities come to re-
semble disciplines, they may miss their most important opportunities to con-
tribute to genuine growth in knowledge and well being.18 Perhaps we should
be aiming at enhancing integrative praxes by connecting and transforming
knowledge formations. This may or may not involve interdisciplinarity
through integrating disciplinary insight.
None of this denies that disciplines generate knowledge. As Peter C.
Reynolds says, we do not “dispute the factuality of scientific knowledge nor
deny the physical existence of cosmic rays, isotopes, genes, atoms, or what-
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ever” (1991, p. 207). Likewise, we do not doubt the usefulness of notions
such as history, culture, socialization, or psychology. This paper could not be
written without them. “However, science is a process of selection, not acqui-
sition, . . . for every truth revealed by a technique, there are many others that
have been systematically excluded” (p. 207). Ecological interconnection is a
good example. Science did not discover ecology as a result of an accumula-
tion of knowledge or a breakthrough in theory. Ecology, to the extent it has
been discovered at all, was forced upon us by the effects of actions made
possible largely by science and technology. Science did not predict these
effects; they were imposed on us by our experience of the world. The scien-
tific paradigm of the objective observer disconnected from the field of obser-
vation precluded a scientific discovery of the ecological embeddedness of
the scientist. “Global pollution, habitat destruction, and the disruption of natu-
ral cycles are implicit in the industrial imagery of nature as an alien and
untamed force that needs to be made productive by the application of tech-
nique” (Reynolds, 1991, p. 210). It is not clear whether “science” as cur-
rently practiced and understood, is capable of generating an effective response
to our actual ecological relatedness.19
One task of integrative praxes may be to seek the excluded truths and to
understand their roles in guiding human conduct and in tempering what is
otherwise held to be knowledge. “Who gets to decide what counts as knowl-
edge?” is a question worth keeping in mind. If knowledge is increasingly
accurate observation, description, prediction, and manipulation of interac-
tions of matter and energy, then science from 1500 to 2000 was a great en-
gine of knowledge. If knowledge is increasingly satisfying existential expe-
rience in the context of harmonious (real and felt) relations with the commu-
nity of beings, including but not limited to humans, then that same science
may have done rather poorly.
Another good question is “who gets to ask the questions we will try to
answer?” The United States spends vast amounts of money developing medical
procedures, drugs, and machinery to extend the lives of the well-to-do. Many
more people would be helped, and many more years of human life would be
lived, if those funds were spent on simple public health and nutrition pro-
grams at home and abroad. What would happen if the poor set the medical
research agenda, rather than the rich? We also spend vast quantities of en-
ergy, money, and technology on experiments meant to probe the micro and
macro secrets of the Universe: on high-energy particle physics and Hubble
telescopes. To what extent does this contribute to living well, compared, for
example, to research on alternatives to violence, or on restoration of indig-
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enous peoples to traditional lands, or on intercultural, interreligious commu-
nication? Advocates of pure research often point out that it may have appli-
cations in the future we cannot imagine today. But this applies to any re-
search whatsoever: it does not direct our energies in any particular direction.
Yet another good question is “who benefits from the processes of asking
and answering?” Who actually decides where the world’s research focus will
be placed? How are they (we?) linked with the flow of resources associated
with that research? I believe it would take a good deal of digging and, per-
haps, some soul searching, to answer that question. Is it the case, as Berry
avers, that academic disciplines participate in “the culture of division and
dislocation, opposition and competition, which is to say the culture of colo-
nialism and industrialism” (2000, p. 122)? He claims that, “a conformity
between science and the industrial economy is virtually required by the cost-
liness of the favored kinds of scientific research and the consequent depen-
dence of scientists on patronage” (p. 63). “[S]cience serves progress, indus-
try, and the corporate economy, (while) the literary culture . . . gives its tacit
approval to the program of science-technology-and-industry and, itself, serves
nothing” (p. 68). Certainly, I know that the president of the state university I
worked at until three years ago had begun to call it “Value Added Univer-
sity.” The state of North Carolina justifies its expense on public education
primarily because of its purported contribution to “the economy,” which forces
universities to support their own requests for funding in the same terms.20 By
this means, knowledge is defined as the information, concepts, theories, skills,
and practices that enhance the operation of the current economic system and
its enterprises, what Berry calls the conformity between science and the in-
dustrial economy.
As Donna Haraway says, “in traditional philosophical categories, the is-
sue is ethics and politics perhaps more than epistemology” (1996, p. 113).
This is an important point. It is, of course, true that scientific concepts coupled
with technology “can do” many things. For example, it can build a bomb that
uses nuclear power and detonate it anywhere. This is, however, a proof by
power. And we should remember the long and complex relationship between
science and technology, for existing scientific models rely on a history of
instrumentation for their development. Certainly, those techniques and skills
of perception give rise to an experience of the universe that supports the
scientific model of it, and which validates that model through the powerful
effects of its corresponding technologies. But what other experiences of the
universe are possible? What other ways of being and acting in the universe
could they give rise to? Among them, which are most conducive to human
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well-being? If the answer given is simply that “the search for knowledge is
valuable in its own right, and should not be impeded by any external forces,”
this is an appeal to the world of ethics and politics, not that of science. And,
indeed, economic, political, and personal forces extraneous to the idea of
science have shaped the movement of science and its technologies from the
beginning, as I will discuss below. Thus the fact that scientific knowledge
allows people to do things to other people and to our world is no validation of
science, any more than the fact that a government can do things to other
people and their world is a validation of that government.21
The remainder of this article is an attempt to bring ethics and politics into
the “theory of interdisciplinarity” and to the notion of integrative praxes.
Newell’s theory rests, I believe, on two intertwined assumptions, neither of
which has been critiqued: the notion of a consensus about interdisciplinarity,
and the notion that disciplines are a necessary presupposition of
interdisciplinarity. In what follows, I will probe both these assumptions, be-
ginning with consensus and moving on to the disciplines.
In a short first section, I will claim that what Newell presents as consensus
is actually an orthodoxy that should be unmasked and unsettled (for ethical
and political reasons) rather than used as the cornerstone of a foundational
theory.
Moving on from this claim, I will briefly explore an emerging literature
on the nature of disciplinarity. This literature does not so much focus on any
particular discipline, but on the very fact that disciplines themselves exist,
and on the implications of that fact. This investigation of discipline forma-
tion, past and present, will support five major claims, considered as subhead-
ings under the general heading of “discipline formation past and present”:
1. the disciplines’ objects of knowledge do not exist independently. They
are brought into being, along with the (kind of) knowing subjects who
know them, and the means by which they are known;
2. disciplinarity as a phenomenon is a historical and cultural artifact, and
the broad outlines of its generation can be described;
3. human bodies are deeply implicated in all acts of knowing. Specific
bodily disciplines are correlated with specific possibilities of knowing,
and the rise of the Academy is linked with the development of particular
bodily disciplines;
4. processes of discipline formation are ongoing and contemporary. Nor-
malizing forces currently shape disciplinary activity and are in large mea-
sure responsible for the appearance of what Newell takes to be consensus
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and which I critique as orthodoxy;
5. gatekeeping, or deciding what gets to be included in a field or domain,
is at the heart of Newell’s article and this response to it; it is a profoundly
consequential issue for the future of “interdisciplinarity.”
I end with a short section in which I try to imagine how to know the world
differently, an imaginative project clouded by the fact that I can only per-
form my acts of imagination from within those knowledge formations I now
inhabit, despite my desire and need to imagine beyond and outside them.
Consensus or Orthodoxy?
As I noted above, Newell’s theory of interdisciplinary studies relies on the
existence of a consensus concerning interdisciplinarity that, for example,
allows him to define his subject in a single declarative sentence: “By defini-
tion, interdisciplinary study draws insights from relevant disciplines and in-
tegrates those insights into a more comprehensive understanding” (p. 2). By
asserting such a consensus, he seems to be able to sidestep the thorny issue
of what gets to count as interdisciplinarity, and proceed directly to a key
unmet theoretical need: an account of the nature of interdisciplinary integra-
tion. Yet by uncritically accepting  what appears to him as consensus, Newell
may actually be participating in the production of uniformity, rather than the
clarification of consensus. The essay that is the subject of this issue may
abet a knowledge formation which requires ethical and political, as well as
epistemological critique. From my social location in the Academy, and given
my intellectual commitments, what Newell presents in this paper as consen-
sus I suspect is the result of the normalizing influences of institutional pres-
sures rather than of arriving at commonly held positions as the result of
shared reasoning and evidence. Instead of being taken for granted and fur-
ther cemented with “epistemological theory,” the “consensus on
interdisciplinarity” may itself need investigation.
In a first response, I note that this “consensus” notion of interdisciplinarity
Newell presents diverges significantly from mine and from those of many of
the colleagues with whom I work most closely. Within the Department of
Interdisciplinary Studies at Appalachian State University, there is a range of
opinions concerning the status and value of “the disciplines.” However, I
believe none of us would grant them the semi-ontological status provided by
Newell, and many of us are unwilling to offer them the role as “starting
points” Newell believes to be supported by consensus. Outside the depart-
ment, many colleagues complain that interdisciplinary studies as a field has
84 Richard M. Carp
abandoned its historic status by “turning itself into another discipline,” thereby
both ignoring and marginalizing important work that crosses, connects, and
confounds disciplines but does not fit into the pseudo-disciplinary defini-
tions now defended by “interdisciplinarity.” Colleagues in, e.g., Latin Ameri-
can Studies and Women’s Studies, argue that “rules and theories” for
interdisciplinarity (such as Newell proposes) reify a concept
(interdisciplinarity) that has no fixed objective referent. They would argue
that the objects of study (e.g., women or Latin America) determine the form
and structure of the work to be done and that there is no necessary correlation
between the kind of knowledges and integrations needed to study one in
comparison to those needed to study another.
In this respect, it is enlightening to compare Julie Thompson Klein’s (1990)
list of steps in the interdisciplinary process with Newell’s redaction of it (pp.
14-15). Klein’s second step is “determining all knowledge needs, including
appropriate disciplinary representatives and consultants, as well as relevant
models, traditions, and literatures” (1990, p. 188). Klein’s notion is in har-
mony with the idea of learning from multiple knowledge formations, be they
academic disciplines, vernacular discourses, practices and skills normally
excluded from consideration as knowledge, or resources emerging from other
cultural contexts altogether. Newell says his version of Klein’s criterion “ab-
stracts from messy issues of teamwork” (p. 14). His proposal is “determining
relevant disciplines [interdisciplines, schools of thought]” (p. 15). Something
more than “messy teamwork” has been dropped. Klein begins with the need
to know. Her formulation (knowledge needs) is open to knowledge forma-
tions that are not disciplines, knowledge that must be developed either within
or outside of existing disciplines, knowledge imported from outside the acad-
emy or from another cultural context, and knowledge that is needed but whose
generation cannot now be imagined. Newell begins with existing knowledge,
primarily as presented by the disciplines.
In 1984, Roland Barthes wrote:
Interdisciplinary work, so much discussed these days, is not about con-
fronting already constituted disciplines (none of which, in fact, is willing
to let itself go). To do something interdisciplinary it’s not enough to choose
a “subject” (a theme) and gather around it two or three sciences.
Interdisciplinarity consists in creating a new object that belongs to no one.
(p. 97)
Contrast this with Newell’s definition cited above: “By definition,” he writes,
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“interdisciplinary study draws insights from relevant disciplines and inte-
grates those insights into a more comprehensive understanding” (p. 2).
Newell defines interdisciplinarity as a process of integration rooted in but
going beyond previously existing disciplinary knowledge. Barthes, in con-
trast, defines interdisciplinarity as a process of bringing new objects of knowl-
edge into being, a process of knowledge formation. With Barthes, and contra
Newell, I understand “interdisciplinarity” as a search not only for new “knowl-
edge” but also of new ways to know and of new “things” to be known, in-
cluding new social relations that generate and validate knowledge, new spa-
tial experience giving rise to new “knowing subjects,” and new dimensions
for knowledge. A bit earlier in his article, Newell glosses the motivations for
interdisciplinary study, taking them from his survey with Julie Thompson
Klein for the Handbook of the Undergraduate Curriculum (p. 5). In addition
to the seven motivations listed there, I would add creative insurgency—a
desire to change the structures through which knowledge is generated and
disseminated by confounding, resisting, transforming, and replacing exist-
ing institutional forms (perhaps in perpetuity).22
In one sense, this may seem to be merely a semantic disagreement. Couldn’t
“interdisciplinarity” be reserved for Newell’s meaning, and some other term
be coined for what Barthes and I find to be important? But the dispute is not
really semantic because there is more involved than a word. First, Newell is
making a move to correlate an intellectual process (interdisciplinarity) and a
domain of problem (what he calls “the complex”). In fact, Newell attempts
to parse out domains and approaches. Objects with single facets require only
disciplinary study; multi-faceted but incoherent objects correspond to a
multidisciplinary approach, since no integration is necessary or possible. He
refers to “widely accepted distinctions between interdisciplinarity and multi-
or trans-disciplinarity. More to the point, those distinctions now emerge natu-
rally from the epistemology of interdisciplinarity” (p. 6).23
Newell’s epistemology leaves no room for “creating a new object that
belongs to no one.” I cannot give an example of such an object, precisely
because it would be new, and would emerge in a domain of knowledge for-
mation that does not yet exist. Nor can I denote it as single faceted, multifac-
eted but incoherent, or complex; nor can I know in advance if it is purely
academic, not academic at all, or a hybrid of knowledges currently held within
and without the academy: this is what it means to be a knowledge object that
belongs to no one.
By eschewing the domains of politics and ethics Newell’s proposal also
fails to take into account positions and claims already set forth by women
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(see e.g., Haraway, 1996), inhabitants of the internal colonies of the West
(see, e.g, Carp, 1994), incompletely modernized denizens of Western cul-
tures (see, e.g., Seremetakis, 1994), and people from other cultural trajecto-
ries (see, e.g, Stoller, 1997). Haraway asserts that all knowledge inheres in a
specific human body, marked by gender, age, class, race, and personal his-
tory. Amalia Mesa-Bains (1994) invokes an inseparable relationship between
spirit, land, and identity, revealing that Chicanos and Latinos in the United
States, living as members of internal colonies, act to support their cultural
survival by remembering a land buried under the asphalt, steel, and plastic
detritus of the colonizing power. Nadia Seremetakis (1994) describes the
power of reflexive commensalities: structures of sensory experience embod-
ied in meals, journeys, gardens, ways of speaking (especially to and about
children), and other sensory structures imbued with meaning. These mean-
ings, and the understandings of reality linked to them, can only be communi-
cated through the shared sensual experience of commensality. Stoller (1997)
invokes the griots of Niger, who experience anthropologists who study them
as griots-in-training. These anthropologists, “eaten” by (Nigerian) history
and memory and charged to tell Niger’s stories, return home and infuse the
American cultural landscape with African tradition in a powerful act of re-
verse colonization. How might attention to these knowledge formations as-
sist us in our attempt to live well?
Newell’s exclusions necessarily make us numb to our own embodiment
as well, even if that embodiment is male, middle class, and European. If
knowledge is not linked to lived bodies in socio-cultural contexts, then my
knowledge is not linked to my lived body. I am then destined to live as a
disembodied mind and a mindless body. This experience (sometimes called
the mind/body problem) is characteristic of academic knowledge formations.
In The Production of Space, French metaphilosopher Henri Lefebvre reveals
the social and historical links between the production of knowledge and the
production of power-over others (colonialism), over natural forces (science/
technology), and over ourselves (social science). But what, he asks is the
justification, for assigning priority to what is known or seen over what is
lived (1991, p. 61)? As Merleau-Ponty eloquently says, we behave “[a]s if
bread and wine and labor were in themselves less grave and sacred things
than history books” (1964, p. 4). Yet if I am to live well, it will be as a man,
born in 1949, raised in the United States of America, with all the specific
contexts by which I am informed and to which I am beholden; if you are to
live well, it will be in and as the specific bodily circumstances that make up
the very life you are living well. What we need are mindful bodies and em-
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bodied minds—bread, wine, labor, what is lived are grave and sacred things.
Newell’s theory, then, has four critical absences: it leaves no room for the
creation of new objects; it leaves no room for knowledge objects that belong
to no one; it leaves no room to learn from those who have not participated in
the development of the Academy; and it leaves no room for our bodies. These
absences enable the appearance of consensus on which Newell’s theory de-
pends. The appearance of consensus, in turn, allows Newell to overlook the
role of the Academy as an institution in the knowledge formations on which
he relies.
Nevertheless, institutional resources (and therefore the material lives of
individuals and communities) are both at work and at stake in the debate.
They are at work because allocations of institutional resources, exerting nor-
malizing pressure over twenty-five or more years, are mostly responsible, I
believe, for producing the appearance of consensus to which Newell refers, a
theme to which I will return in some detail below. Institutional resources are
at stake, for intellectual practitioners and practices that receive the stamp of
academic respectability (publication, faculty appointments, journals, litera-
ture, lexicons, departments and centers, and so forth) attract further resources,
while those that are marginalized fall further and further behind in competi-
tion for scarce resources. While nature may not be Hobbesian and Darwinian
(the survival of the fittest having been replaced in evolutionary theory by the
survival of those that fit), the Academy most surely is! If Newell’s asserted
consensus were to become academic dogma, a wide range of investigations
and many interdisciplinary approaches and practices would be pushed pro-
gressively further from their own appropriate embodiment within a (trans-
formed) academy.24
In general, we cannot specify, with any detail, what these investigations
and approaches might entail, because their very coming into being would
require institutional transformation; but we can imagine. What would a true
pursuit of sustainable development look like in an academic incarnation?
How could we envision a genuinely multi-cultural University, in which vari-
ous tests of validity, drawn from multiple cultural sources, were used to test
what counts as knowledge? What would the academy be if women and their
experience were truly taken seriously? How might the Academy function if
haptic knowing were primary and verbal insight were secondary? How would
we inhabit a College in which individuals were held to be secondary to the
traditions from which they emerged and with whose continuation they were
charged? How would the sciences function if they were held to Newell’s test,
rather than the test of economics? Some people believe these sorts of inves-
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tigations, approaches, and practices are important to knowledge production
and to the well-being of the human community and the broader community
of beings within which we inhere. Whether or not they will take place within
the Academy is significant.
Discipline Formation, Past and Present
Surprisingly, Newell’s essay does not refer to the increasing body of litera-
ture that considers the role of cultural, historical, and institutional factors in
the formation and normalization of disciplines. This absence leads me to
suggest that interdisciplinarians, in addition to needing an adequate under-
standing of the knowledges on which we wish to draw, need also an adequate
understanding of critiques of those knowledges. As Newell himself has writ-
ten (with William Green), “Disciplines are not natural species amenable to
systematic characterization through a taxonomy, but rather social organiza-
tions whose origins and continued existence are as much attributable to edu-
cational politics as to the needs of scholarly inquiry. A discipline is perhaps
best characterized as a socio-political organization which concentrates on a
historically linked set of problems” (1982, pp. 23-30). In contrast, “A Theory
of Interdisciplinary Studies” rests on the assumption that, “the various disci-
plines have been developed to study the individual facets or sub-systems [of
phenomena]” (p. 2). Although Newell abandons the copy theory of truth in
respect of the “test of knowledge,” he has not yet abandoned it in respect of
the disciplines, for “each discipline has been developed to illuminate a dif-
ferent, particular facet of reality” (p. 19).
For this essay only a few sources in the literature of discipline formation
can be consulted, and those only incompletely.25 Taken together these sources
(e.g., Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan, 1993; Clifford and Marcus,
1986; Foucault, 1973; Behar and Gordon, 1995) present us with the follow-
ing claims, and a body of evidence and reasoning to support them:
1. The objects we investigate and about which we “know” do not exist
independently,
2. but are brought into being by a complex economy of factors that also
brings into being our investigation of the “objects of knowledge” and the
knowledge we claim;
3. disciplinarity as a phenomenon is an artifact of a confluence of
psychological,economic, political, and institutional factors characteristic of
a phase of the development of modernist capitalism in Western Europe and
the United States from the late eighteenth century to the present; this
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confluence deeply marks the disciplines as gendered (male), ethnic/racial
(European/white), and economic (middle-class, capitalist) phenomena, with
respect to their objects of study, their methods of study, and their disciplinary
structures;
4. disciplines in their current forms and day-to-day development are shaped
by political and economic factors endogenous to the disciplines themselves
and to their institutional instantiations but exogenous to their ostensible ob-
jects of study.
Disciplines, then, appear as knowledge formations.
If these claims are credible, they have important implications for our as-
sessments of the disciplines and of the knowledge they present:
a. Disciplinary knowledge and the practices and institutional forms that
generate and support it may distort, as well as reveal, important as-
pects of the world we wish to know. The world as it appears is already
displayed through a disciplinary lens, so the fit between world and
discipline is to some extent illusory. This illusion, pursued long enough
and with enough dedication, could lead to a profoundly inadequate un-
derstanding. Two examples come easily to mind. The disciplinary struc-
ture of the academy divides the world into semi-autonomous realms,
each with its own boundaries, internal structures, appropriate methods
for investigation, and so forth. As a result, we tend to experience the
world itself as composed of distinct, and largely disconnected, domains
of existence, while ignoring those aspects of the world that are con-
tinuous, interconnected, confounding of borders, and mutually impli-
cated. The second is that science, because it is built on the assumption
that the “observer” is distinct from the “observed,” systematically fal-
sifies the relationships between human conduct and the other entities
with which we share the globe. The ecological crisis is not an “acci-
dent” of cultural development; it is a necessary corollary of the meta-
physics that underlies the scientific enterprise, and that views nature
“as an alien and untamed force that needs to be made productive by the
application of technique. . . . The social and ecological conditions that
threaten the health and security of contemporary societies are not for-
tuitous events that could never have been anticipated, but the logical
consequence of [an] image of the human species and its relationship to
nature.” (Reynolds 1991, p. 211)
b. disciplinary knowledge and the practices and institutional forms that
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generate and support it may reflect and privilege social, political, eco-
nomic, and cultural forces in the guise of disinterested, objective, and uni-
versal knowledge. Assuming disciplines as the starting places for knowl-
edge and for action based on knowledge may (un)intentionally participate
in and support processes of political, psychological, ecological, and cul-
tural domination. For example, the Academy and its knowledges are im-
plicated not only in ecological degeneration, but in colonial domination
over other countries; processes of cultural destruction both in the United
States and in other countries; and in the domination and degradation of
women by men.26
c. Disciplinary knowledge and the practices and institutional forms that
generate and support it may hide factors extraneous to knowing and acting
(personal agendas, frameworks of social and economic reward systems,
the quest for institutional prestige, and so forth) that seriously hamper the
pursuit of adequate understanding and appropriate action and that are, in
any case, irrelevant to and deforming of knowing.
These claims have important implications for our assessments of the disci-
plines and the knowledge they (claim to) present. In effect, these reflections
suggest we may need to overcome, replace, or supplement disciplinary prac-
tices and their attendant knowledges, if they are to serve our aim of living
well.
Although I am largely convinced by the claims presented by students of
the disciplines, I am by no means arguing that interdisciplinarity should adopt
these positions as a counter-orthodoxy to the consensus Newell puts forth.
On the contrary, I believe we need to leave the door open for a long time to
come (forever) for competing and contradicting understandings of our enter-
prise and its underpinnings. “Accounts of a ‘real’ world do not, then, depend
on a logic of ‘discovery,’ but on a power-charged social relation of ‘conver-
sation’” (Haraway, 1996, p. 125). There is more than one valid pursuit of
interdisciplinarity, and there is more than one helpful theory for clarifying
these pursuits; an ongoing conversation about and among these may be the
most helpful stance for interdisciplinarians to take.
The Objects We Investigate and About Which We ‘Know’
Do Not Exist Independently, but Are Brought into Being
by a Complex Economy of Factors that also Bring into
Being Our Investigation of Them and the Knowledge We
Claim
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Above, Barthes claims that genuine interdisciplinarity “brings into being a
new object of knowledge.” Although Newell believes that disciplines exist
because they mirror (however imperfectly) aspects of reality about which we
wish to know (see below), other epistemologists believe that disciplines are
at least as much creators of their fields of knowledge as their creations. Be-
low, we will briefly investigate man, nature, and knowers as they are impli-
cated in disciplinary knowledge.
In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault spends nearly four hundred pages
considering the emergence of the idea of man in Euro-American intellectual
discourse. His arguments and data are much too complex to review here, but
his conclusion is worth repeating:
One thing in any case is certain: man is neither the oldest nor the most
constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge. Taking a
relatively short chronological sample within a restricted geographical
area—European culture since the sixteenth century—one can be certain
that man is a recent invention within it. It is not around him and his secrets
that knowledge prowled for so long in the darkness. In fact, among all the
mutations that have affected the knowledge of things and their order, the
knowledge of identities, differences, characters, equivalences, words—in
short, in the midst of all the episodes of that profound history of the Same—
only one, that which began a century and a half ago and is now perhaps
drawing to a close, has made it possible for the figure of man to appear.
(1973, p. 386)
Foucault then claims that the “object of knowledge” of the human sci-
ences does not exist but has been brought into being. Beyond that, he be-
lieves that the forces that made “man” appear are waning and it will fade
from the scene, along with the sciences that study it. When this happens, new
concepts and means for understanding human being will no doubt appear.
Because these concepts and knowledge formations will bring into being “a
new object,” we can only speculate as to its actual content and structure.
Studies and claims have been made with reference, e.g., to nature, the
object of study of the physical and natural sciences that resemble those Fou-
cault makes with respect to man, the object of study of the social sciences.
Carolyn Merchant, in The Death of Nature, discusses how nature was con-
structed in large part through Francis Bacon’s rhetoric of science and its con-
nections with the sexual rhetoric of contemporary witch trials (1980, pp. 168-
169). Bacon cast nature as a recalcitrant female deserving of and responsive
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to the techniques of witch interrogation. Nature had to be “hounded in her
wanderings” and her “holes and corners” should be “entered into and pen-
etrated” by the man seeking truth (Bacon 1901, p. 296). She was to be “bound
into service” and made a “slave,” after she was “put in constraints,” one
should “torture secrets from her” in order to discover secrets hidden in her
“womb” (Bacon 1901b, p. 20; 1901a, pp. 287, 294). Thus, nature and woman
are constructed in relation to one another. Equally, they are constituted in
relation to man, to sexual violence, to subjugation, and to bondage. They are
linked to human nature (the subject of the human sciences) and to humanity
(the subject of the humanities).
At the same time that man and nature were constituted, so too was the
knowing self. Hume and Kant made it clear that Africans, and other people
not derived from Europe, were “by nature” incapable of fully rational thought
(Gates, 2001; Eze, 1997). The knowing self could only be male, white, and
European. At its outset, disciplinary knowledge was marked as misogynist,
racist, and ethnocentric. Nor have these marks been entirely effaced.
Although Newell uses the metaphor of a map to clarify the notion of dif-
ferent kinds of systems, he does not make use of Korzybski’s famous dictum
that the map is not the territory. Maps (or systems) are constructed in relation
to specific constraints and assumptions (for example, those regarding woman,
nature, and knowers discussed above). The factors that affect system forma-
tion likewise affect what appears as reality in the domain of that system,
which is a mental formulation (a map), not reality (the territory). The con-
structed character of systems calls for a careful investigation of the factors
involved in (but often effaced by) the generation of particular systems and
for reflection on how those factors shape the systems and the apparent knowl-
edge that emerges from them. It is evident that there must be other knowledges
that will emerge from other systems linked to other processes of construc-
tion. These knowledges, too, aim at, and to some extent succeed in, describ-
ing a world in which to live. Again we are brought to the metaphor of conver-
sation: a conversation among multiple, constructed knowledges (knowledge
formations) that are necessarily partial, historical, cultural, gendered, and
useful—in the sense of Newell’s test—more useful in conversation than pos-
ing as all-sufficient monologues.
To the extent that disciplinary knowledge participates in creating the ob-
jects it knows and the knowers who know them, we must be careful when we
found new knowledge on existing disciplines. Wendell Berry remarks:
It is a fact that the solutions invented or discovered by science have tended
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to lead to new problems or to become problems themselves. Scientists
discovered how to use nuclear energy to solve some problems, but any use
of it is enormously dangerous to us all, and scientists have not discovered
what to do with the waste. (They have not discovered what to do with old
tires.) The availability of antibiotics leads to the overuse of antibiotics. . .
. Science does not seem to be lighting the way; we seem rather to be leap-
frogging into the dark along series of scientific solutions, which become
problems, which call for further solutions, which science is always eager
to supply, and which it sometimes cannot supply. (2000, p. 33)
One task of integrative praxes may be to bring new objects and new knowing
selves into being, to query the world and our experience of it in ways that
generate new problematics, new questions, new objects, and new knowledges,
some of which may challenge existing knowledges, or even be incommensu-
rate with them. One task of integrative praxes may be to listen carefully to
learn from the excluded knowledge formations of the dispossessed—women,
the poor, the internal colonies, the external colonies, webs of cultural trajec-
tories outside Europe and the United States. If so, integrative praxes cannot
begin by presuming or incorporating the disciplines, and Newell’s trope of
integration will not be helpful.27
Disciplinarity as a Phenomenon Is an Artifact of a
Confluence of Psychological, Economic, Political, and
Institutional Factors Characteristic of a Phase of the
Development of Modernist Capitalism in Western Europe
and the United States from the Late Eighteenth Century to
the Present
This claim both supports and is supported by the previous one. The ideas
presented in this section, taken in relation to one another, indicate that both
the disciplines and the objects they investigate are in part contingent histori-
cal and cultural artifacts. Actually, as we will see, they also suggest that the
self-experience of the knower—the subjective, felt identity of the cognizing
subject necessary to disciplinary knowledge—is itself such an artifact, and is
in part generated by processes emerging from and feeding back into the cre-
ation of disciplinarity as an historical fact. If these claims are credible, nei-
ther the disciplines and their knowledges, nor the sense of conviction they
create in us, as knowers, are reliable guides to an extra-historical, or even
cross-cultural, reality. Just because we have a seemingly unmediated experi-
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ence of the world, we have a subjective experience of knowing that is con-
firmed by techniques of knowledge production (e.g., empiricism, reason,
experimentation), we may share both experience and knowing with a broad
intersubjective community, this doesn’t mean our knowledge escapes his-
tory and culture and reflects some more absolute reality.
Given the artifactual nature of disciplinarity, integrative praxes may need
to resist, confound, transform, or otherwise creatively engage history and
culture on behalf of the emergence of new possibilities of knowing, possi-
bilities that may manifest as new practices and institutions for knowing, new
realms to know, and new self-experiences of knowers. Haraway insists we
need the “close touch of the fantastic element of hope for transformative
knowledge and the severe check and stimulus of sustained critical inquiry
[for] any believable claim to objectivity or rationality not riddled with breath-
taking denials and repressions” (1996, p. 118). Neither the disciplines as they
exist, nor an integration of them, may be adequate to this task.
Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity is a collec-
tion of essays intended to explore disciplinarity as “a historically contingent,
adventitious coherence of dispersed elements” (Messer-Davidow, Shumway,
and Sylvan, 1993, p. 3). In the preface, the editors point out:
For only two centuries, knowledge has assumed a disciplinary form; for
less than one, it has been produced in academic institutions by profession-
ally trained knowers. Yet we have come to see these circumstances as so
natural that we tend to forget their historical novelty and fail to imagine
how else we might produce and organize knowledge. (p. vii)
This text contains sixteen investigations into the character of the disci-
plines. Some focus primarily on a single discipline, while others span the
concept of disciplinarity in toto. We can sample only a few below, highlight-
ing some of their most important assertions.
1. Disciplines emerge from changes in educational practices that eventually
transform both concepts of the self and normative self-experience.
Keith W. Hoskin argues that deep-level changes in the structure of knowl-
edge emerge from coordinated changes in education systems. People do not
simply learn different things, or even learn differently, but we learn to learn
differently. Disciplinarity is thought to emerge from the coordination of three
educational practices that were chained together near the end of the eigh-
teenth century: “constant rigorous examination, . . . numerical grading of the
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results of this examination, . . . an insistent process of writing by students,
about students, and organizationally around students” (1993, p. 272).
After examining the development of the seminar in Germany (and its trans-
formation of language via philology) and of the laboratory in France (and its
transformation of the material world via experimental science), Hoskins moves
on to the development of modern economics in England. Here the effect of
this new educational technology is not only profound, it inscribes itself in the
prose of the key player, Adam Smith. Redrafting The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments in response to various critiques, Smith finds himself redescribing the
self as split into two persons (!) one of whom is an examiner or judge and the
other that same person submitting to judgment.
Thus the self was reconstituted as a double self, the spectator-examiner
and the agent-examinee . . . self-interest is no longer necessarily doomed
to degenerate into pure selfishness now that dispassionate impartiality has
been relocated as an integral part of a self that is constantly engaged in the
active examination of itself. (1993, p. 292)
The self is now engaged in continuous self education, examining, grad-
ing, and inscribing itself. In Bacon’s terms, there is now in every self a male,
or human (examiner, judge) and a female, or natural self (the recipient of
judgment). The new system of education has become a new self-understand-
ing.
One implication of this analysis is that in part, the self, to whom disciplin-
ary knowledge is credible, is a creation of the very processes by which the
disciplines were themselves created.28
2. Transformed self-experience lays the foundation for new understandings
of the relationship between intention (planning), outcome (profit and loss),
and judgment (evaluation).
Psychological changes lead to a new universal discipline (accounting, but
also accountability) that makes possible the business revolution, which forms
the context for academic disciplines, per se, to come into being.
Building on the thesis presented immediately above, Hoskin and Richard
H. Macve (1993) argue that the new experience of the self provides the foun-
dation for the development of modern accounting, which was itself a precon-
dition for the large scale coordination of economic activities that character-
izes modern and postmodern economic systems. The initial breakthroughs
toward the business revolution, they write,
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are invisible technologies: technologies that work first on humans, not on
machines. And more generally, the invention of modern business should
be seen as part of the transformation to a modern disciplinary world, where
disciplinary organizations dominate—such organizations as those that dis-
cipline their members but that also depend on and feed off academic disci-
plinary knowledge. (p. 29)
They hold up accounting as the key discipline for understanding moder-
nity, giving it priority over both economics and psychology, because “it is
centrally involved in constructing the world wherein modern economics and
psychology are invented . . . part of the condition of their very existence” (p.
26). That is to say, disciplinarity in general follows upon sociocultural devel-
opments that transformed Euro-American culture into the culture of busi-
ness, while accounting, the key to that transformation, itself followed upon a
transformation of self experience and self understanding generated through
new educational practices. Following Alfred Chandler, they argue that mod-
ern business is a “disciplinary breakthrough, with accounting playing a cru-
cial role” (p. 28). The key to modern business is managerialism made effec-
tive through administrative coordination which “in large part depends upon
the deployment of accounting and accountability systems” (p. 28).
Daniel Tyler, who worked at Springfield Armory, and George W. Whis-
tler, who worked at the Western Railroad, were cadets at West Point when it
was transformed via the chaining of educational techniques and practices,
into a “modern disciplinary educational institution” (Hoskin and Macve, 1993,
pp. 30-31). Herman Haupt, with Andrew Carnegie’s Pennsylvania Railroad,
came from the same institution a generation later. These men applied the new
academic principles to economic activity at large: there was to be a constant
process of writing, in which plans, work objectives, schedules, profit mar-
gins, and the like were to be continuously inscribed (memos, budgets, evalu-
ations, directives, mission statements, strategic plans); all aspects of eco-
nomic activity (including its human elements) were to be measured and as-
signed evaluative numerical equivalents (graphs, charts, merit evaluations,
projections, demographics); these numbers were to be constantly evaluated
against the goals and objectives articulated in the process of writing, and
vice versa. The world of economic activity was subjected to the newly devel-
oped structure of the disciplinary academy.29
The mark is the invisible technology that lies beneath [the principle of
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calculability]. It does not just put a number on performance; it puts a value
on you, the person. It provides for the first time in history an objective
measure of human success and failure. Your desire is to be number one;
your fear is that you are nothing but a zero. How do you prove yourself?
Only by performing and being objectively appraised. Hence the emer-
gence of the modern double-bind power of accountability. (1993, p. 32)
Not only does the modern disciplinary academy flourish in the new busi-
ness culture, developing significant ties binding the two together, but also,
the modern disciplinary academy is rooted in notions of accountability, be-
ginning with measuring and ranking students but extending into every aspect
of academic life. Entrance examinations and grading, merit rankings and pro-
motions, but also departmental and other budgets, assessment, and accredita-
tion are founded on notions of measurement and accountability.
Moreover, the modern disciplinary academy serves the new business cul-
ture. Historically, that culture has served the interests and in large part been
the engine of colonialism and imperialism. It has led to the ideology of what
Zoe Sofoulis (1988) has called resourcing, in which all elements of the natu-
ral world exist merely as resources (human and natural) to be transformed
into something else. Just as money translates all things into a universal lan-
guage, in which apples, yachts, and the hours of a human life are equivalent,
so resourcing turns all things, including human beings, into equivalences:
they (we) are “only the raw material of culture, appropriated, preserved, en-
slaved, exalted, or otherwise made flexible for disposal by culture in the
logic of capitalist colonialism” (Haraway 1996, p. 124).
Professors, says Paul Feyerabend:
serve masters who pay them and tell them what to do: they are not free
minds in search of harmony and happiness for all, they are civil servants
(Denkbeamte, to use a marvelous German word) and their mania for order
is not the result of a balanced inquiry, or of a closeness to humanity, it is a
professional disease (1987, p. 315).
Thus the modern academy and its disciplines may take root far from any
integrative praxes, far, indeed, from living well.
3. “Disciplines are not natural unities but arbitrary classifications; they con-
tain numerous fields, many of which have less in common with each other
than they do with fields in neighboring disciplines” (Messer-Davidow,
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Shumway, and Sylvan, 1993, p. 11).
In the same volume, Julie Thompson Klein’s “Blurring, Cracking, and Cross-
ing: Permeation and Fracturing of Discipline” (1993), investigates bound-
ary-permeating activities, in contrast to the more customary research into
boundary formation and maintenance. Disciplines in this essay, appear as
socially-constructed and institution-bound strategies for controlling the flow
of resources and managing the direction of intellectual change. Klein notes
that “Since the 1960’s permeations of the boundaries dividing the subfields
of physics and other disciplines have displaced the notion of physics as a
single, isolated discipline. . . . [Professional publications] depict a physics
characterized by cross-disciplinary permeations in the arenas of both funda-
mental and applied science, though permeations are rendering that distinc-
tion more problematic” (p. 201). Yet institutionally, Klein notes, the disci-
plinary and departmental structure of physics retains significant force, what
she, following Stocking and Leery, calls the “‘inertial strength’ of disciplin-
ary formation” (p. 202).
Donald Preziosi’s article “Seeing Through Art History,” also in the same
volume, proposes that art history is an artifact of filmic technology, which
alone has made possible the astonishing taxonomy that enables the combina-
tion of attributed causality (artistic influence), location in histories of style
and form, and relation of artifacts to other historical contexts (e.g., politics,
religion), that we associate with the discipline of art history (pp. 220-222;
see also Preziosi, 1989).30
If disciplines are not natural unities, but congeries of practices, instru-
mentations, knowledges, and resource flows, what epistemological status
could they have as foundations for other (i.e., interdisciplinary) researches?
If at least some disciplines are artifacts of technological or other cultural
developments, what status does their knowledge have in relation to a world
or reality supposed to underlie or precede cultural formation?
The works cited above present a set of interrelated metaphors for the phe-
nomenon of disciplinarity and the disciplines: a psycho-social sediment of
educational techniques that reformulate the experience of the knowing self; a
socio-cultural manifestation of economic practices rooted in and rigorously
regulating that reformulated self-experience; a convenient institutional fic-
tion; an artifact of new media.31 Other chapters in this book would provide
yet other metaphors. Taken together, they provide a warrant for caution in
treating the disciplines as the necessary starting points for guiding our ongo-
ing search for adequate and appropriate knowing. Klein’s “determine all
knowledge needs” seems more apropos than Newell’s “determine relevant
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disciplines” (Klein, 1990, p.188; Newell, p.15). Actually, investigations into
disciplinarity place even Klein’s formulation into doubt. Before determining
our knowledge needs, we will need ways to investigate, undermine, and trans-
form our questions, for they, too, emerge out of a context thoroughly perme-
ated by disciplinary practices, knowledges, and institutions. We shall have to
abandon the copy theory of truth not only with respect of interdisciplinary
solutions, but also in relation to the disciplines and other knowledge forma-
tions.
Disciplines and Bodies
Specific disciplines of the body correspond to specific experiences of the
world. Academic thought is produced by a specifically disciplined body, one
that can tolerate sitting for hours in sterile rooms buzzing with the sound of
fluorescent lights, listening to word after word after word of lecture after
lecture. These bodies have been taught to dissociate from themselves, trained
to delay elimination (and even the experience of the need to eliminate), to
repress the experience of sexual desire, hunger, and thirst, to still the urge for
movement and kinesthetic expression for a slumberous physical stillness
which is required not only for attending (conferences, classes, laboratories)
but also for reading, writing, and computer work. Our willful unconscious-
ness of the academic body is literally senseless, and depicts a wishful fantasy
of panoptical truth, of a nowhere where truth is not dependent on embodi-
ment, situation, culture, or psychology. Yet we know that knowledges are
tied to bodily disciplines. Yogic knowledge, for example, is the end of a long
process of bodily training. The Academy can pretend to present universal
knowledge only by claiming Academic bodies require no special discipline.
The anybody of the Academic body corresponds to the nowhere of Academic
space. Yet the universality of academic knowledge is premised on the univer-
sality of the academic body. How can we understand the depth and limits of
our own knowledge without experiencing its links with our bodily disciplines?
The apparent universality of the body, along with the apparently universal
applicability of disciplinary knowledge, participates in a characteristic qual-
ity of modernist and capitalist society: the production of seamless rationality,
characterized by Lefebvre as abstract space. Logic as we experience and
understand it, is produced within this space, and on its behalf:
logic characterizes a double imposition of force: first in order to maintain
a coherence and, later, in the shape of reductionism, in the shape of the
strategy of homogenization and the fetishization of cohesiveness in and
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through reduction of all kinds. It is logic that governs the capacity—bound
up with violence—to separate what has hitherto been joined together, to
fracture all existing unities. (1991, p. 412)
Logic, that is, does not exist, any more than any other knowledge formation.
Logic is produced through a process characterized by force; far from reflect-
ing reality, it violates it. As we will see below, there are other logics that may
work equally well to describe the world, and may work better to enable liv-
ing well, but these logics cannot inhabit abstract space.
All spaces are the same in abstract space. It is the space of nowhere, which
belongs, as we have seen above (note 11), both to transcendent objectivism
and to radical relativism. But every person is always actually somewhere.
Integrative praxes begin here, where one is. “The only way to a larger vi-
sion,” writes Haraway, “is to be somewhere in particular” (1996, p. 123).
Abstract space is the space of abstractions, the space of resources, where
actual entities are reduced to their categorical being: not this tree, or this
river, or this person, but merely trees, rivers, persons, or even more abstractly,
natural and human resources. But as Berry points out:
even scientists do not speak of their loved ones in categorical terms as “a
woman,” “a man,” “a child,” or “a case.” Affection requires us to break
out of the abstractions, the categories, and confront the creature itself in
its life in its place. . . . [T]hings cannot survive as categories but only as
individual creatures living uniquely where they live. (2000, p. 41)
Newell comes heartbreakingly close to escaping the domain of abstract
space, for example in his call for humility, which approaches the affections
that individualize and localize us. He seems at times to recognize the impor-
tance of local, differential, particular existence for knowledge. For example,
he sees that, “if one is trying to understand the behavior of a specific place
within a complex system, local knowledge matters” (p. 10), but he does not
link this insight to Berry’s insistence that all existence (and therefore all inte-
grative praxis) is inevitably local. Finally, he applies the notion of local knowl-
edge fruitfully only to justify his view of interdisciplinarity for work in the
humanities. Thus, he misses an opportunity to acknowledge the inevitable
localism of every articulated knowledge, to join Haraway in a sense of
positioned rationality. [Whose] images are not the projects of escape and
transcendence of limits, i.e., the view from above, but the joining of par-
101Integrative Praxes
tial views and halting voices into a collective subjective position that prom-
ises a vision of ongoing finite embodiment, of living within limits and
contradictions, i.e., of views from somewhere. (1996, p. 123)
Our finite embodiment can serve as a metaphor for locality. Abstract bod-
ies are merely bodies, but all actual bodies are cultured bodies, and culture
affects our overall, unconscious, automatic approach to the coherence of the
world. “People reared in different cultures learn to learn differently” (Hall,
1959, p. 53). “Culture has always dictated where to draw the line between
one thing and another” (Hall, 1977, p. 230). Bodies (not just human bodies,
but the body/boundaries that define entities) are produced, not given. “[B]odies
as objects of knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes. Their bound-
aries materialize in social interaction. Boundaries are drawn by mapping
practices; ‘objects’ do not pre-exist as such” (Haraway 1996, p. 127).
Differences in where to draw the line between one thing and another are a
matter of bodily learning, e.g., discipline, manifest in experience. For in-
stance, in the West we experience a human surrounded by a skin and sup-
ported by bones and a nervous system and experience it as a single and indi-
vidual thing, a person. But for the Pueblo Indians, a kin group resembling a
lineage is experienced as the single individual, and the people are experi-
enced as parts (Hall 1980, pp. 231-232).
As a result, cultures enact different logics, which are conscious or semi-
conscious explications of the tacit structures which shape their worlds (see,
e.g., Motokawa 1989). Says Hall:
Having had a number of experiences in my lifetime with cultures as dis-
parate as the Japanese and the Navajo, neither of which finds the Western
system of logic effective, convincing, or acceptable as a way of arriving at
a decision, I am not at all convinced that there is anything sacred in logic.
I find nothing wrong with the mental processes of either culture. Both
have highly reliable ways of arriving at correct decisions as well as testing
the validity of those decisions. (1977, p. 213) 32
In 1990, Lawrence Sullivan, now Director of the Center for the Study of
World Religions at Harvard University, published a review article titled “Body
Works: Knowledge of the Body in the Study of Religion.” His remarks have
salience for all forms of study.33 He begins by asking what the body knows
and what value the body’s knowledge may possess, and reflecting on cultural
others, who have served “as data to be explained, rather than as theoretical
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resources for the sciences that study them” (p. 87). Yet these cultures and
their members have their own “elaborate anthropologies, including subtle
construals of the body and its processes of knowing” (p. 87). Moreover, these
anthropologies are, from time to time, universal in their scope, addressing
the human per se. “Just as Greek philosophers did in their day and French
deconstructionists did in the 1970s, so the members of these societies wish to
offer comment and reflection upon the human condition in our day” (p. 87).
Often they do so:
in a bodily experience—rather than through the transmission of narrative
doctrine or discourse. In other words, the knowledge of the body that we
wish to study and understand is itself often transmitted through culturally
shaped experiences of the body. (p. 87)
Yolmo healing knowledge is transmitted from one body to another, as the
healers say, “by heart” (Desjarlais, 1992, pp. 26-27). Yogic knowledge, too,
must be learned in the body, and not from discursive formations. Actually,
much of Western science works in this way, too. One must, for example,
learn how to see through a microscope—a bodily knowledge some cannot
master. Knowledge of many kinds in many cultural contexts is transmitted
primarily through disciplines of the body and the experiences attendant upon
them. As Sullivan notes, this is not a fact from which one can remain de-
tached, for it impinges on our own self-understanding, as well as the status of
our systems of knowledge (1990, p. 88).
The rudimentary issue is not the role of any Western discipline in under-
standing body knowledge, but, rather, the role of body knowledge in the
Western disciplines. “As both Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu have
urged, attention to discipline is not merely a concern about institutions and
professionalization; it is above all concern about bodies—human bodies.
Disciplines are institutionalized formations for organizing schemes of per-
ception, appreciation, and action, and for inculcating them as tools of cogni-
tion and communication.” (Lenoir, 1993, p. 72)
Since the body is so often demonstrated to be a primary instrument of
knowledge, and since the understanding of the body can vary markedly from
one culture and epoch to another, we may have to add to our customary list of
hermeneutical reflections yet another question: What kind of challenge is
our own bodily existence? (Sullivan, 1990, p. 99) 34
Like the knowledge they generate, bodies are intrinsically political and
ethical. There is a politics of the senses that we ignore to our peril (Seremetakis,
103Integrative Praxes
1994, p. 13). Abstract space effaces our awareness of the politics of the senses,
for
[t]he structure of modern sensory experience is inherently ironic. The sen-
sory sphere is experienced in such a manner that profound transforma-
tions occurring in it or imposed on it are rendered imperceptible. (p. 19)
Seremetakis tells a story, beginning with her recollection of a peach, the
rhodhákino, or “breast of Aphrodite” (a mastós tis Afridhítis). It is a peach
that can no longer be found, whose taste, scent, color, and texture can no
longer be relished. Tied to the sensual experience of this peach, as Seremetakis
unwinds her tale, are a whole set of understandings that extend into the per-
sonal (her childhood), familial (her grandmother), cultural (Greece, stretch-
ing back to the archaic age), generational (her grandmother’s relationship
with herself and her parents), philosophical (the value of stillness vs. that of
speed), historical (the destructive impact of modernization), and political (the
role of the EU in sensory processes), all of which have been partially effaced
by the disappearance of Aphrodite’s breast, and which have been further ob-
scured by other sensual erasures and displacements.
Disciplines belong to the apparatus by which this vanishing act is accom-
plished. The methods of the disciplines belong to and integrate with the vari-
ous technologies by which academic knowledge is produced. “These tech-
nologies are ways of life, social orders, practices of visualization. Technolo-
gies are skilled practices” (Haraway, 1996, p. 119).
Perception, too, is a skilled practice, engendered from early infancy through
culturally induced processes.35 David Rubin (1988) admonishes us to focus
on skills and process models, rather than on structures and formal models, in
our description of perceptual and cognitive abilities. Perception and cogni-
tion are things we do, actions emerging from skill. The everyday world of
cultural normalcy and the specialized world of academic knowledge are co-
produced from a shared set of skills embedded in our bodies and their techni-
cal and technological extensions. Thus, “struggles over what will count as
rational accounts of the world are struggles over how to see” (Haraway, 1996,
p. 120).
As I noted above, the point is not to deny the factuality of scientific knowl-
edge, but to insist on its incompleteness, to contest its adequacy, to dispute
its appropriateness, to assert its partiality, to reveal those who benefit from it
and those who do not, to discover the subjectivity to which it belongs, and to
insist on the embodied, situated, limited, engaged character of all knowing. I
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cannot know the world in the way it is known by those whose perceptual
skills differ deeply from mine, nor is there any rational reason to assume that
the world as I experience it is uniquely more suited for human life than the
worlds known by those other ways of experiencing. There is, in fact, every
reason to expect a richer and fuller account of the world (and a richer and
fuller life in the world) to emerge from our respectful, hopeful, and critical
conversation than from any monologue, no matter how poetic or brilliant.
Contemporary Normalizing Forces Shaping Disciplinary
Activity
Discipline formation and the maintenance of disciplinary boundaries are not
merely historical facts. They are active today, and play an important role in
our daily lives as members of academic institutions and the larger machinery
of professional validation that makes up the Academy.
Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus, 1986) provides a useful discussion
of disciplinarity in the context of contemporary academic life. It is the result
of an intensive set of discussions at the School of American Research in
Santa Fe, New Mexico, in April 1984. Ten participants met over a week,
after having previously circulated papers, to discuss “the making of ethno-
graphic texts” (p. vii). In the introductory chapter, “Introduction: Partial
Truths,” Clifford identifies “at least six” ways ethnographic writing (and other
academic enterprises including interdisciplinarity) are constrained, includ-
ing contextually (drawing from and creating meaningful social milieu), insti-
tutionally (“within, and against, specific traditions, disciplines, audiences”),
and politically (“authority to represent cultural realities is unequally shared
and at times contested”) (p. 6). 36
In “Representations Are Social Facts: Modernity and Post-Modernity in
Anthropology,” in the same volume, Paul Rabinow considers the politics of
writing about anthropology. His reflections are relevant to our considerations,
as well. “[T]he stakes,” he writes, “are not directly political in the conven-
tional sense of the term. I have argued elsewhere (1985) that what politics is
involved is academic politics and that this level of politics has not been ex-
plored” (1986, p. 252). Rabinow goes on to refer to Pierre Bourdieu’s work
on the notion of habitus, which leads to a sociology of cultural production
that
does not seek to reduce knowledge to social position or interest, per se
but, rather, to place all of these variables within the complex constraints .
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. . within which they are produced and received. Bourdieu is particularly
attentive to strategies of cultural power that advance through denying their
attachment to immediate political ends and thereby accumulate both sym-
bolic capital and “high” structural position. (p. 252)
My wager [he continues] is that looking at the conditions under which
people are hired, given tenure, published, awarded grants, and feted would
repay the effort. . . . How are careers made now? How are careers de-
stroyed now? What are the boundaries of taste? Who established and who
enforces these civilities? Whatever else we know, we certainly know that
the material conditions under which the textual movement [in our case
read interdisciplinary movement] has flourished must include the univer-
sity, its micropolitics, its trends. We know that this level of power rela-
tions exists, affects us, influences our themes, forms, contents, audiences.
We owe these issues attention—if only to establish their relative weight.
(pp. 253-254)
Disciplines in general, and interdisciplinarity in specific, have an obliga-
tion to self-reflection, a responsibility to incorporate situation and situatedness
into accounts of ourselves. However, despite its expressed intent to reveal
the processes by which disciplines, specifically anthropology, take the shape
of the political and institutional forces that surround them, Writing Culture
was itself revealed in its own generation to have hidden and participated in
those very processes.37 In 1995, twenty-three women wrote, Women Writing
Culture. No two pages in the history of anthropological writing have ever
created as much anguish among feminist readers as did James Clifford’s un-
easy statements justifying the absence of women anthropologists from the
project of Writing Culture (Behar and Gordon 1995).
[W]e have become all too aware that not only were women anthropolo-
gists excluded from the project of Writing Culture but so too were “na-
tive” and “minority” anthropologists. In the words of the African Ameri-
can critic bell hooks, the cover of Writing Culture “hid the face of the
brown/black woman” beneath its title, graphically representing the con-
cealment that marks much of the writing inside. (pp. 7-8)
Even while unmasking the impacts of social location and interest in disci-
pline formation, the authors of Writing Culture concealed the effects of their
own social locations on their process of unmasking! (No doubt my own so-
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cial location marks this essay, too . . .)
Taken together, these and numerous other works not cited here undermine
Newell’s notion of discipline. Rather than corresponding, however roughly,
to actual domains in the real world, disciplines may be far more arbitrary
and ephemeral. They may arise from and rely upon a culturally constructed
and historically unstable experience of the self. They may correspond to ob-
jects which arise simultaneously with themselves and with which they both
generate and are generated by. They may be instantiated in institutional forms
that reflect local and global economic and political factors more than intel-
lectual distinctions. They may be shaped and controlled by their own internal
politics and the habitus of institutions, departments, and professional asso-
ciations. They may reflect a gendered and cultured history of power. They
may, therefore, not be the best bases on which to develop a complexly inter-
related knowledge of the world (including ourselves) whose effects are prag-
matically beneficial to human and ecological well-being or whose imagery
leads us deeper into the heart of the world.
Gatekeeping
I have dwelt at length on disciplinarity and discipline formation because I
believe that is the central issue at stake in Newell’s “A Theory of
Interdisciplinarity” and our responses to it. We are considering what activi-
ties and practices get to count as interdisciplinarity, what institutional forms
are congruent with them, and what their appropriate literary and other forms
of expression may be. Newell’s piece would in effect close the gate and de-
fine the password for admission.
In Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention (1996),
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi writes about the importance of gatekeepers in cre-
ativity. Gatekeepers “decide whether a new idea or product should be in-
cluded in the domain” (p. 28). Gatekeepers comprise what he calls the field.
He comments:
In my view of the situation, if the systems model of creativity is accurate,
then it follows that creativity can be enhanced just as much by changing
the field—by making it more sensitive and supportive of new ideas—as
by producing a greater number of creative individuals. Better training,
higher expectations, more accurate recognition, a greater availability of
opportunities, and stronger rewards are among the conditions that facili-
tate the production and the assimilation of potentially useful new ideas.
(p. 336)
107Integrative Praxes
Interdisciplinarity is involved in an attempt at field formation. Actually, the
project may be yet more radical, the formation of a new domain—what
Csikszentmihalyi calls, “a set of symbolic rules and procedures” (p. 27). Under
these circumstances, gatekeeping is a fundamental concern.38
As I noted above, Newell’s career has primarily taken its shape in the
context of discipline formation: field or domain creation. He has played a
powerful role in developing the institutional reality of IDS in the United
States, serving as Executive Director of the Association for Integrative Stud-
ies for some twenty-eight years, and visiting campuses to consult about in-
terdisciplinary studies for two decades or more. He has affected the distribu-
tion of rewards to interdisciplinarians, by evaluating faculty members for
appointment, tenure, and promotion and responding to inquiries concerning
candidates to chair interdisciplinary departments. He has also trained aspir-
ing interdisciplinarians (via a FIPSE grant) and published a book aspiring to
present the key extant literature on interdisciplinarity. He has been a force in
the field.39 These activities perform the function described by Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi as gatekeeping: deciding “whether a new idea or product
should be included in the domain” (1996, p. 28, see below).
I believe that the appearance of what Newell calls consensus and I call
orthodoxy represents institutional control—over publication, appointment,
and other decisive academic machinery—by one of the sets of competing
voices within the community of interdisciplinarians. Newell’s theory is the
next step in a process by which this voice might become “normative” and
institutionalized. Not surprisingly, this faction is the one which views
interdisciplinarity as at once most like the disciplines and least dangerous to
them, at once easiest to incorporate into the university and least likely to
seriously disrupt it.40
What is needed is not “an epistemology of interdisciplinarity” (Newell, p.
15), but a sociology, or perhaps an anthropology, of knowledge that grounds
the disciplines in their historical and cultural moments. Following on a re-
view of then contemporary critiques of epistemology, Paul Rabinow, in Writ-
ing Cultures (1986), provides four “initial conclusions and research strate-
gies” that follow from these critiques: first we should understand that episte-
mology is an historical event, “a distinctive social practice, one among many
others, articulated in new ways in seventeenth century Europe.” Second, we
should eschew a “theory of indigenous epistemologies or a new epistemol-
ogy of the other,” rather being wary of “our historical practice of projecting
our cultural practices onto the other.” Third, “we need to anthropologize the
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West: show how exotic its constitution of reality has been,” and fourth, “we
must pluralize and diversify our approaches” (p. 241).
To this we should add Haraway’s insistence that “ethics and politics co-
vertly or overtly provide the bases for objectivity in the sciences as a hetero-
geneous whole, and not just in the social sciences” (1996, p. 125). Therefore,
we need “a doctrine and practice of objectivity that privileges contestation,
deconstruction, passionate construction, webbed connections, and hope for
transformation of systems of knowledge and ways of seeing” (p. 117). “It
is,” she says, “precisely in the politics and epistemology of partial perspec-
tives that the possibility of sustained, rational, objective inquiry rests” (p.
117).
Newell asserts that disciplines persist because their assumptions reflect
principles governing facets of reality. We have encountered good reasons to
doubt that this is the case. As Timothy Lenoir (1993), writing in Knowledges,
puts it, “disciplines are political institutions that demarcate areas of academic
territory, allocate privileges and responsibilities of expertise, and structure
claims on resources” ( p. 82). That is to say, they are fields governed by
gatekeepers.
We can also query Newell’s claim about the persistence of disciplines
from a cross-cultural perspective. All cultures may be said to have disci-
plines, or, in terms of this paper, knowledge formations. That is to say, cul-
tures involve organized means for developing, testing, and maintaining knowl-
edge. These means require mastery of practices, and one may engage in them
only after approval by qualified authorities. For example, Paul Stoller (1997)
has written at some length about witchcraft among the Songhay of Niger (pp.
4-43). This ancient and well-established discipline requires learning, appren-
ticeship, and diligence. It results in capacities and abilities, as well as both
practical and theoretical knowledge.41 Will Newell affirm that Songhay witch-
craft, like physics, persists because its assumptions mirror some facet of re-
ality? What shall we say about Navajo curative sings with sand paintings, or
the practice of Ayurvedic medicine? The Western academic disciplines are
less than two centuries old. Many other knowledge formations have endured
far longer: to what do we attribute this persistence? If we acknowledge their
however imperfect correspondence to a relevant arena of reality, how shall
we deal with their incommensurability with our own disciplinary approach
to knowledge? How would we move toward integrative praxes across these
boundaries? What roles do political, economic, and military power play in
the ascendancy of one set of knowledge formations over others? These ques-
tions, it seems to me, compose a necessary component of integrative praxes.
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Concluding Projections
Let me end by first recapitulating, and then anticipating. I have attempted to
demonstrate that what Newell presents as consensus is actually an orthodoxy
that should be unmasked and unsettled (for ethical and political reasons) rather
than used as the cornerstone of a foundational theory. We have discovered
that the disciplines’ objects of knowledge do not exist independently. They
are brought into being, along with the (kind of) knowing subjects who know
them, and the means by which they are known. We have also discovered that
disciplinarity as a phenomenon is a historical and cultural artifact, and the
broad outlines of its generation can be described. Because human bodies are
deeply implicated in all acts of knowing and specific bodily disciplines are
correlated with specific possibilities of knowing, the rise of the Academy is
linked with the development of particular bodily disciplines. Therefore, we
are called upon to acknowledge and take into account the role of our own
bodies in our knowledge. We must acknowledge that processes of discipline
formation are ongoing and contemporary and that we are enmeshed in them.
Normalizing forces currently shape disciplinary activity and are in large
measure responsible for the appearance of what Newell takes to be consen-
sus and which I critique as orthodoxy. Finally, gatekeeping, or deciding what
gets to be included in a field or domain, is at the heart of Newell’s article and
this response to it.
I have proposed that we abandon altogether the metaphor of
“interdisciplinarity” and its dependence on the image of the disciplines, re-
placing it with an image of integrative praxes that learn from multiple knowl-
edge formations.
How might we then move toward integrative praxes? We will have to
begin by recognizing the incompleteness and insufficiency of any knowl-
edge formation or set of knowledge formations to fully meet the test of knowl-
edge—that we live well. This means there will always be a complex conver-
sation among competing and cooperating nexus of knowledge formations.
Further, we will have to acknowledge that living well is not self evident, but
essentially and necessarily contested. So we must imagine an ongoing and
perpetual conversation about the very test by which we will assess the valid-
ity of our knowledge. Finally, given their implication in so many of the prob-
lems that threaten our very life, much less the goodness of that life, we must
acknowledge that the Western sciences in large measure fail that test today.
There are virtues we need to face the future well. Newell names one: hu-
mility. There are others: courage, openness, creativity, and genuine interest
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in others. That is, simply strengthening and developing the dominant knowl-
edge formations is unlikely to ameliorate our life, to meet the test of knowl-
edge. More of the same is unlikely to bring us anything but more of the same.
Yet how can we, in the context of the same, imagine what is different?
Lefebvre provides one metaphor in his notion of differential space:
By seeking to point the way towards a different space, towards the space
of a different (social) life and of a different mode of production, this project
straddles the breach between science and utopia, reality and ideality, con-
ceived and lived. It aspires to surmount these oppositions. (1991, p. 60)
As Jana Carp and I (In Press) have written:
The crux of the matter is that “logico-mathematical space” is used by pro-
fessional and academic experts as “the locus of a ‘theoretical practice’
which is separated from social practice and which sets itself up as the axis,
pivot or central reference point of Knowledge ” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 6).
This abstract praxis, because it is conceived/experienced to be separate
from both ideology and non-knowledge (lived experience), “creates an
abyss between the mental sphere on one side and social spheres on the
other” (p. 6).
   For Lefebvre, “differential space” responds to abstract space as both
diagnosis and aim; a theorized new space that is both liberatory and trans-
forming, emerging out of and in contrast to the dominant space of global
capitalism. Abstraction itself is not demeaned in differential space. . . .
The point is rather that “the truth of space” emerges in a relation of mental
and sensory experiences and knowledges that characterizes differential
space, while “true space” (the false “Truth” of abstract space) results from
repressing the sensory and imposing homogeneity on lived experience.
   [A]bstract space is quintessentially the space of the Academy, which
propounds ever more adequate systems theories, ever more complete data
sets, ever increasing “correspondence” between what is thought and what
is. This ultimately excludes, silences, what is sensed: knowledge that is
self-reflectively partial (and therefore incomprehensible), embodied in
particulars, fluid and relational, both integrating and sustaining social and
other differences. Thus abstract space is also the space of models while
differential space is not: for this reason Lefebvre refuses, adamantly, to
provide a template for differential space. To do so would be to enclose it
within abstract space, to clip its transformative promise. (1991, pp. 398-
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399)42
Here Lefebvre diverges from Newell, for whom knowledge is character-
ized by the creation of models of ever greater adequacy and efficacy. But
how might we think about the world except with the use of models? If this is
posed rhetorically, it evades the challenge of integrative praxes; the potential
of interdisciplinary thought escapes us. If this is posed as a creative chal-
lenge, we begin to encounter a great opportunity. How, indeed, might we
imagine the world so that our imaginings reveal us to be in that very world
we are imagining? How might we create faithful images of the world in which
we are implicated (both in the images and in the world imagined)? There
would necessarily be many different such images; their interrelationship would
necessarily be differential, not transcendent, for our inherence in the world is
multiple, complex, different.
This brings us back to Donna Haraway’s work, and the notion of situated
knowledge. The idea is quite simple. Knowledge claims are always claims
by someone. That someone inhabits a body, instantiates a culture, enacts a
sex and gender: is situated. As we have seen above, every situation is perme-
ated with skills and technologies that shape bodies, with acculturated per-
ceptual systems that teach their possessors how to divide the world into enti-
ties. A knowledge claim that pretends to be unmarked by the situation of the
claimant is a claim from nowhere. This “position” (which is really no posi-
tion) characterizes both transcendent objectivism and relativism, as we have
seen above. Both rely on abstract space for their credibility.
Positioning implies responsibility for our enabling practices. It follows
that politics and ethics ground struggles for the contests over what may
count as rational knowledge. That is, admitted or not, politics and ethics
ground struggles over knowledge projects in the exact, natural, social, and
human sciences. (Haraway, 1996, p. 119)
Partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make ra-
tional knowledge claims. These are claims on people’s lives; the view
from a body, always a complex, contradictory, structuring and structured
body, versus the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity. (p. 121)
[W]e do need an earth-wide network of connections, including the ability
partially to translate knowledges among very different-and power-differ-
entiated communities. We need the power of modern critical theories of
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how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to deny meaning and
bodies, but in order to live in meanings and bodies that have a chance for
the future. (p. 113)
Newell approaches both Lefebvre’s and Haraway’s insights when he writes:
“In short, place matters. And if one is trying to understand the behavior of a
specific place within a complex system, local knowledge matters” (p. 10).
Place matters! This could be a simple formulation of differential space. Places
differ; they matter; thus awareness of what matters must be attuned to differ-
ence, must be differential. “Local knowledge matters.” This could be a simple
formulation of situated knowledge. When is one not concerned with a spe-
cific place? This person. This forest. This stream. This group of people living
in this place speaking this language enmeshed in this matrix of cultural tra-
jectories. If the test of knowledge is its ability to assist us to live well, each
application of the test is local.
Wendell Berry may help us to focus again on the disciplines. “The disci-
plines,” he writes, “are different from one another, each distinct in itself, and
rightly so. Science and art are neither fundamental nor immutable. They are
not life or the world. They are tools. The arts and the sciences are our kit of
cultural tools” (2000, p. 121).
The purpose of these tools, he boldly states, “is our dwelling here on earth
. . . the proper work of culture . . . a diversity of dwellings suited to the
diversity of homelands” (p. 122). Only in collaboration might these tools
possibly be used to accomplish this task. Only in collaboration might we
discover what tools we lack, which needful acts we cannot perform. As the
proverb goes, “With only a hammer, the whole world becomes a nail.”
Berry entices us to imagine the results of a genuine conversation among
the disciplines. What would it be like if, along with “art criticism” we taught
and avidly practiced criticism of “farming or forestry or mining or manufac-
turing” (p. 112)? Or physics and chemistry, I might add. He remarks, “in
universities, one discipline is rarely called upon to answer questions that
might be asked of it by another discipline” (p. 129). Here is a vision of “in-
ter” disciplinarity that carries within it the seed of political, ethical, economi-
cal institutional change, though, like Berry, I am at a loss as to how to engen-
der it. But it is a vision that reminds me of the insurgent, transformative
impulse at the root of some versions of interdisciplinarity, an impulse not
only hinted at in Newell’s vision of our task.
The world we study is the world in which we live, and our studying of it is
one component of our living in it. But the end and goal of all our studying is
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our life. To be right if one is dead is little solace; to be right if one’s knowl-
edge has killed one’s fellows is less. We are multiple, complex, contradic-
tory; in ourselves as individuals, amidst one another as bearers of culture;
among ourselves as inhabitants of varying networks of cultural trajectories.
The world we study and in which we live is not the passive object of our
inquiry and recipient of our actions. We did not create the world; the world
created us. This is an objective, not a theological claim, in the sense that
integrative praxes allow for objectivity. The world existed before I did, and
before homo sapiens, as well. The world’s processes, whatever they may be,
whether divinely authored or materially random, brought us and me into be-
ing. The world is active, not passive, and it is a tricky place, where not even
the boundaries between things are given or fully fixed. As Haraway sug-
gests, learning about the world is like talking with Coyote: interesting, pow-
erful, dangerous, and ironic.
We live in this world. That living provides both the motive and the test of
our knowing. We think to live, and to live well. The “we” that lives in this
world is deeply multiple, differentiated by age, gender, culture, history, and
other contexts and affinities. This multiplicity is either a great strength or a
great stumbling block. In the face of the dream of universal, unassailable,
absolute knowledge, it is a scandalous obstacle that must be overcome. Ev-
ery difference must be rendered insignificant in the face of Truth. But our
differences make up our identities; our specificities comprise our lives; when
they are rendered insignificant, so are we. How can such a Truth serve the
end of living well? Perhaps, then, the world is vast, inexhaustible, and mys-
terious. Perhaps the rich diversity of our experiences of this world offer us
ever increasing opportunities to learn from one another in a conversation
without end. This conversation can link our knowledge formations, without
subjugating one to another, engendering dynamic and thoughtful practices
and dynamic and practical thoughtfulness-integrative praxes-as we pursue
the art of living well, each living well as the specific, embodied, situated
human being we are.
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Notes
1. Of course, as Gregory Bateson points out in Mind and Nature (1979), this could
change. Thoughtfulness (or any other adaptation) enhances natural selection until it
no longer does, after which it becomes a liability, rather than an advantage.
2. Personal is not synonymous with individual, although they tend to be conflated in
the mainstream of Euro-American cultural trajectories. The person may be under-
stood and experienced as profoundly communal. For example, Margaret Miles (1985)
writes extensively about the historical and cultural strangeness of our current experi-
ence of the person. See also Hall, 1977, pp. 231-232.
3. I have begged the question of what constitutes “doing the good” or living well. One
of the roles thought should play is to help us engage that question.
4. I am indebted to Caroline Haynes who responded to an earlier version of this paper
by insisting that I account more fully for the gendered nature of the disciplines. This
insistence sent me to Donna Haraway, and to other sources now integral to my think-
ing.
5. For some useful reflections on the damaging character of “art for art’s sake” and its
possible replacement with an art aimed at integrative praxes, see Gablik (1984; 1991),
Lippard (1983; 1990), and Lacy (1995).
6. I have taken the idea of cultural trajectories from Robinson and Koester’s Trajecto-
ries through Early Christianity (1971).
7. For this reason, I considered using the term (dis)integrative praxes, to emphasize
the inherent processes of splitting and the realization of multiplicity. However, the
difficult neologism of the term and its raucous postmodernism dissuade me. None-
theless, I am not satisfied with “integrative praxes.”
8. This indicates that there are affective as well as cognitive components to thinking
well. Paul Stoller, in Sensuous Scholarship, has some lovely things to say about the
role of humility in academic life (1997, pp. 135-137).
9. I agree with Julie Thompson Klein (“Complexity: The Tests of Theory”) that
Newell’s piece falls short of the formal requirements of theory.
10. See, e.g., Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 36.
11. Insisting on the partial and situated character of all knowledge does not imply the
absence of a real world in which we (must) live and toward which our knowledge
aims. Actually, radical relativism, like transcendent objectivism, denies the signifi-
cance of the knower’s actual location. If transcendental objectivism claims “to be
everywhere and so nowhere, to be free from interpretation” (Haraway, 1996, p. 122),
relativism presents itself as “nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally. The
‘equality’ of positioning is a denial of responsibility and critical inquiry. Relativism is
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the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of objectivity; both deny the
stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspective . . . promising vision from
everywhere and nowhere equally and fully . . .” (Haraway, 1996, p. 117). See also
Carp (1991, pp. 287-288) on what I have called cheap relativism.
12. Newell and I both agree, as a matter of principle, that it is a cardinal sin of
interdisciplinarity to work with an impression of material emerging in a discipline,
rather than with the material itself. Unfortunately, I believe that Newell is inadequately
grounded in complexity theory to use it in the fashion he attempts in this paper. How-
ever, I, too, am not competent in dynamical systems theory, so I will leave this cri-
tique to others more qualified than I to make it. See for example, J. Lynn Mackey’s
article in this issue.
13. In Creativity (1996), Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi proposes that gatekeeping is the
critical function for understanding creativity as it actually manifests in the socio-
cultural field. He believes that there is a significant amount of individual creativity,
but that those advances are not integrated into various symbolic domains because of
the inability or unwillingness of the gatekeepers of those domains to acknowledge
the creative advances. If we want a more creative society, he says, it would be better
to improve our gatekeeping than to invest in increasing individual creative acts.
14. It is not clear how this is integrated in Newell’s mind with the larger test he
proposes and I have articulated as integrative praxis.
15. We shall have to understand interdisciplinarities in the same manner. This is co-
herent with the suggestion above that we uncover the institutional, political, eco-
nomic, and personal dimensions of our processes of knowledge generation.
16. Of course, as Jay Wentworth, editor of this publication, pointed out in a note to
me, ignorance may sometimes promote well-being.
17. This is especially important because Newell often makes an appeal to a purported
consensus in relation to which some aspect of this theory can be understood. For
example, he claims that the exclusions of work from interdisciplinarity entailed by
the theory, “correspond to widely accepted distinctions between interdisciplinarity
and disciplinarity and multi-disciplinarity” (p. 6). And we find, “There is widespread
agreement that interdisciplinarity is a process. Likewise, there is general, but vague
agreement on the steps in the process.” (p. 14). Like disciplinarity, consensus is a
hidden assumption, one I will discuss at some length below.
18. Andrew Abbott (2001) argues that interdisciplinarity as it has been practiced since
1937 is a conservative, rather than a transformative, force in academic life. He main-
tains that “problem centered” interdisciplinarity can never replace disciplinary struc-
tures, for a variety of primarily sociological rather than intellectual reasons. I agree
with his analysis, but there are other ways of imagining interdisciplinarity that he
does not consider.
19. Other examples could be generated from other knowledge domains. There is, for
example, the way in which anthropology has attempted to understand cultures by
projecting European forms, or the way in which the arts have imagined the art of
other peoples (as if “art” were a concept that applied anywhere outside European and
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American trajectories).
20. The headline of P. Schmidt’s article in the March 29, 2002 issue of The Chronicle
of Higher Education reads, “States Push Public Universities to Commercialize Re-
search: Conflict-of-interest fears take back seat to economic development.” The ar-
ticle cites concerns expressed by, e.g., Virginia A. Sharpe, Director of the Integrity in
Science Project of the Center for Science in the Public Interest concerns that such
policies might tempt universities to “neglect research that benefits the public in favor
of research intended to help particular companies.” (p. A26)
21. Or, as Reynolds (1991) says, “The efficacy of the atomic bomb no more proves
the truth of physics as a system of thought than the invention of gunpowder by Chi-
nese alchemists proves the truth of Taoism” (p. 209).
22. Creative insurgency is not, I think, linked to complexity in the ways Newell has in
mind, although it certainly is a complex undertaking!
23. One would think by now most scholars would be somewhat leery of such natural
occurrences. The appearance of naturalness in a cultural production is by now a well-
established hallmark of bourgeois culture and, clearly, thought systems are cultural
productions.
24. My work, of which this article is an example, is not rooted in a set of disciplinary
contexts, although it makes use of knowledge generated in disciplines.
25. Querying a text with respect to its “obvious absences” is one method of
“deconstruction.” For an especially brilliant effort in this direction, see Jacques
Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy,” in Disseminations (1981).
26. We should of course also note that the Academy is implicated in the positive
contributions of the culture to which it belongs, such as individual self-determina-
tion, personal liberty, greater equality of status for women, improved public health
and medical care, and so forth.
27. There is an important difference between the metaphor of “listening and learning”
and the metaphor of “integration.” When I “listen and learn,” the other from whom I
learn remains other to me. When I “integrate,” what was other becomes incorporated
into the same, becomes part of me or what is mine, is “integrated.” Listening and
learning keeps the conversation open, forever. Integrating absorbs potential conver-
sation partners.
28. The question of the plasticity of culturally-based experiences of the self is too
complex to enter into here. However, see, for example: Hall (1977), Desjarlais (1992),
Seremetakis (1994), and Carp (1997).
29. It is interesting to reflect how much of Newell’s argument rests on the metaphor
of accountability.
30. This raises the broader question of the impact of technologies, especially media,
on processes of knowing. I have suggested elsewhere both that interdisciplinarity
owes its origin in part to the electronic revolution, and that the most appropriate
expressions of interdisciplinarity involve hybridization of media (Carp, 1999). As
McLuhan expressed it, “Separateness of the individual, continuity of time and space,
and uniformity of codes are the prime marks of literate and civilized societies” char-
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acterized by phonetic writing, in which meaningless symbols are used to refer to
meaningless sounds that refer meaningfully to the world (1964, p. 84f.). Each of
these proceeds by identification and repetition of uniform parts. According to McLuhan,
“The breaking up of every kind of experience into uniform units in order to produce
faster action and change of form (applied knowledge) has been the secret of Western
power over man and nature alike” (1994, 85). The printed book, he says, coupled
with vanishing point perspective, generates the illusion that “space is visual, uniform
and continuous” (p. 172), the very qualities Lefebvre discovers in abstract space which
both dominates and characterizes our moment in history. Lefebvre notes that eco-
nomic activity, social life, symbolization, and formal intellection, especially in the
academy, all take on the character of abstraction and, therefore, assume the appear-
ance of universality (Lefebvre 1991, p. 49). “Perhaps it would be true to say that the
place of social space as a whole has been usurped by a part of that space endowed
with an illusory special status - namely, the part which is concerned with writing and
imagery underpinned by the written text . . . a part, in short, that amounts to abstrac-
tion wielding awesome reductionist force vis-à-vis ‘lived’ experience” (p. 52).
31. Interestingly Marshall McLuhan predicts the rise of interdisciplinarity as a result
of the creation of electronic media. See Understanding Media, e.g., pp. 35-36, 71
(1998).
32. These logics, because they address what goes with what, can also be considered
as aesthetics as Yi Fu Tuan (1993) does in Passing Strange and Wonderful: Aesthet-
ics, Nature, and Culture.
33. We should first note, though, that any notion of the body itself presents some
difficulties. Surely a human body is one of the species-specific characteristics of hu-
man beings. In this sense, it can be affirmed that every person has a human body that
resembles every other human body more than any other species’ body. Taken strictly
in this sense, talk of the body makes sense. But our species body is a plastic one;
moreover, ours is a spectacularly developmental body, radically incomplete at birth
and profoundly affected by the context in which it develops. Even in utero bodies
may display some plasticity. Therefore, the body of another may well be in important
ways other than our own body, despite the residence of both these bodies in our shared
species body.
34. Nadia Seremetakis asks: “if modern-western embodiment has been desensitized,
in what form can perceiving subjects from that context perceive the senses of the
cultural other? Will that particular act of perception merely replicate the very vio-
lence against the senses that the western commentator seeks to escape from, to rectify
and compensate” (1994, p. 125)?
35. For a review of data supporting this contention, see Carp (1997).
36. Julie Thompson Klein’s reflections on disciplinary constraints on contemporary
science are relevant here (1993, pp. 202-203).
37. Yesterday I was talking with our university’s math department chair. “How,” he
asked, “are we going to get rid of departments. They aren’t that old, you know. It was
a noble experiment and we learned some things, but the experiment failed.” Although
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departments and disciplines are not identical, the production of knowledge would
change rapidly and dramatically in the absence of institutional supports provided by
departments.
38. In conversations at Northern Illinois University in spring, 1998, Csikszentmihalyi
further described the key role of gatekeeping in creativity and acknowledged the fun-
damental difficulty involved in extending the creative potential of the field. In gen-
eral, he believes there is no dearth of individual creativity; it is at the level of the field
that creativity diminishes.
39. Institutional politics are never totally absent from the scene, even as I write this.
What if someday I want or need to seek another position? Isn’t it likely Newell would
be consulted concerning my qualifications? Is it possible this critique might affect his
reply? Probably not in this case, but it certainly could with different people involved,
especially if one were vulnerable.
40. Let me reiterate that there is no question of bad faith. It is the responsibility of the
field (and therefore of the readers of this journal) to maintain creative gatekeeping. It
is the responsibility of each individual to pursue what appears to be true.
41. As Stoller learned to his dismay, it “carries with it real consequences—bodily
consequences” (1997, p. 14).
42. This analysis includes and critiques scientific truth as much as any other. The
notion that “scientific (logico-mathematical) truth” is “real” is part of the network of
stories and rationales that makes “abstract space” appear natural and inevitable.
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